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Security continues to be a major challenge for cloud computing, and it is one that 
must be addressed if cloud computing is to be fully accepted. Most technological means 
of securing non-cloud computing systems can be either applied directly or modified to 
secure a cloud; however, no integrated model-based methodology is yet available to 
analyze cloud security requirements and develop policy to deal with both internal and 
external security challenges. This work proposes just such a methodology and 
demonstrates its application with specific cases. Cloud assets are represented by high-
order object models, and misuse cases together with malactivity swimlane diagrams are 
developed to assess security threats hierarchically. Cloud security requirements are then 
specified, and policies are developed to meet them. Examples show how the methodology 
can be used to elicit, identify, analyze, and develop cloud security requirements and 
policies using a structured approach, and a case study evaluates its application by a cloud 
service provider. Finally, the work shows how the prevention and mitigation security 
policies presented here can be conveniently incorporated into the normal functionality of 
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1. I	TRODUCTIO	 
Like all computing systems, cloud computing systems that consider security from 
the initial requirements and design stages are more secure than those that address security 
only once the system is in place. Nonetheless, security requirements are generally not 
analyzed early enough in the system development process, and few organizations 
proactively safeguard sensitive business information stored in the cloud because they lack 
cloud-specific security policies [15]. Due to the complexity of the cloud environment, 
effective testing demands that nonfunctional requirements such as those related to 
security be analyzed and policies be developed early to address them in the development 
process using a comprehensive approach that considers the entire cloud.  
The unified modeling language (UML) [6] that is most often employed to elicit of 
requirements was not initially designed to capture nonfunctional requirements such as 
security requirements. As explained in Section 2 below, existing methods to analyze 
security requirements do not consider both internal and external threats in a structured 
manner. They focus entirely on external misusers and rely only on security technologies 
such as network monitoring systems, intrusion detection and prevention systems, 
firewalls, antivirus systems, and data leakage protection.  
Internal threats have steadily increased over the past few years, and cloud 
computing is not necessarily any more secure internally than noncloud computing 
environments. Internal misusers generally have more knowledge of and access to data 
and applications than do external misusers. Although internal threats cannot be entirely 
eliminated, some effective barriers can be developed to mitigate them. 
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It is crucial, therefore, to use a top-down approach based on a clear policy to 
analyze security requirements and develop effective security policies. Although security 
policies themselves do not solve problems, and in fact can actually complicate things if 
they are not clearly written and consistently observed, policies do define an ideal toward 
which all organizational efforts should point. Therefore, a systematic methodology and 
process are necessary to analyze security requirements and develop security policies for 
cloud computing systems. This methodology must identify security requirements at 
multiple levels to address threats, through user scenarios, posed by both internal and 
external misusers and thus to develop clear cloud security policies that ensure the security 
of the cloud environment. The process presented here employs the high-order object-
oriented modeling technique [2] together with use cases [6], misuse cases [9] and 
malactivity swimlane diagrams [8].  
 
1.1. BACKGROU	D OF CLOUD COMPUTI	G 
Cloud computing has emerged in recent years as a new and important computing 
paradigm; it is gaining increased attention in the service computing community. 
According to the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the cloud computing 
model grants convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable 
computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can 
be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider 
interaction [4]. Cloud computing is still evolving; therefore, its definitions, applications, 
underlying technologies, issues, risks, and benefits continue to be refined. 
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Cloud service providers (CSPs) deliver applications and services that run in the 
cloud; that is to say, they are accessible through the web. A key attraction of cloud 
computing services is that they conceal the complexity of the infrastructure from 
developers and end users. Hence developers and users do not know or need to know what 
is in the cloud – they require only that it deliver the services they need. CSPs offer three 
basic services: infrastructure as a service (IaaS), platform as a service (PaaS), and 
software as a service (SaaS). All these services offer scalability and multitenancy. In 
addition, they are self-provisioning and can be deployed through private, public, 
community, or hybrid cloud deployment modules. 
 
1.2. HIERARCHICAL CLOUD ARCHITECTURE 
This section presents background information on various architectural elements 
that form the basis for cloud computing. Figure 1.1 shows a hierarchical design of cloud 
computing architecture. The figure is best explained from the bottom up. At the bottom is 
the system level, which serves as a foundation and the backbone of the cloud. It consists 
of a collection of data centers that supply the computing power in the cloud environment. 
At this level, there exist enormous physical resources such as storage disks, CPUs, and 
memories.  
Just above the system level is the virtualization level. Virtualization, the factor 
that facilitates cloud computing, is an abstraction of applications and services from the 
underlying physical services. It is achieved with the help of a hypervisor, a software or 
hardware that serves as a bridge between physical devices and virtual applications. This 
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abstraction ensures that no application or service is tied directly on the hardware 
resources. This level manages the physical resources and allows sharing of their capacity 
among virtual instances of servers, which can be enabled or destroyed on demand. The 
physical cloud resources and their virtualization capabilities form the basis for delivering 
IaaS. 
The user-level middleware includes software-hosting platforms such as Web 2.0 
Interfaces that permit developers to create rich, cost-effective user interfaces for web-
based applications. It also provides the programming environments and tools that ease the 
creation, deployment, and execution of applications in clouds. This level aims at 
providing PaaS capabilities. 
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The top user level focuses, as its name suggests, on providing application services 
by making use of services provided by the lower levels. It provides SaaS capabilities. 
SaaS or PaaS services are often developed and provided by a third party distinct from the 
IaaS provider [16]. 
 
1.3. THE HIGH-ORDER OBJECT-ORIE	TED MODELI	G TECH	IQUE 
(HOOMT) 
The HOOMT addresses a challenge faced by requirement analysts and software 
engineers to develop well-structured object-oriented software systems [2]. It incorporates 
the object-oriented paradigm seamlessly into a structured analysis [2]. It also permits the 
development of object, functional, and dynamic models hierarchically according to their 
abstraction levels. The process eliminates incompatibility between a flat object model, in 
which all modeling elements are analyzed at a single level of abstraction, and hierarchical 
functional and dynamic models, in which modeling elements are analyzed at multiple 
levels of abstraction. It uses hierarchical decomposition in the analysis and design of 
object functionality and dynamic behavior. HOOMT also has a unique starting point and 
incorporates nonfunctional requirements. It has three models: the high-order object model 
(HOOM), the hierarchical object information flow model (HOIFM), and the hierarchical 
state transition model (HSTM). This work uses HOOM extensively to model the assets of 
the target system (i.e., the cloud) hierarchically. Liu, Lin and Dong [2] described 
HOOMT notation in detail. 
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2. RELATED WORK 
Although there has been much discussion of cloud computing security concerns, 
few studies have focused on security policies. Hanna [1] proposed a streamlined security 
analysis process to capture and analyze security requirements in cloud computing. His 
method identifies the assets to be protected and the attacks that could be mounted against 
these assets. It then identifies countermeasures. The process prevents or mitigates threats 
posed to the cloud by external misusers; however, it gives little consideration to threats 
posed by internal misusers, especially those who have authorized access. 
A number of proposals address security concerns early in the development 
lifecycle. Ware, Bowles, and Eastman [10] offer a methodology to elicit security 
requirements using common criteria and use cases. Their work extends existing UML use 
case notation used to model requirements so that it can capture actor threats. Their 
approach identifies potential threats by developing actor profiles and identifying threats 
based on relationships among actors in a use case [10]. Sindre and Opdahl [9] also extend 
use cases, which describe what a system should do, to misuse cases, concentrating on 
what should not happen in a system. Their approach combines both use-case diagrams 
and misuse-case diagrams in a single diagram and introduces new relationships like 
prevents and detects. Sindre [8] has also developed malactivity swimlane diagrams, using 
them to capture attacks that could complement misuse cases and thus permitting early 
elicitation of security requirements. His technique permits the inclusion of both hostile 
and legitimate activities. 
  
7 
3. SECURITY CHALLE	GES FACED BY CLOUD COMPUTI	G SYSTEMS 
Because its applications and services are delivered through the internet, cloud 
computing is prone to various kinds of external security risks such as denial-of-service 
(DoS) and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. In addition, and particularly in 
the public cloud deployment module, since data is hosted by the CSP, trust, 
confidentiality, and privacy are also important issues. Finally, communication among 
clouds must be secured to prevent man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. 
Although data stored in the cloud and other compute capabilities are not actually 
in the cloud; they reside in data centers housing hundreds of servers, thousands of 
networking cables, and other physical devices. Nonetheless, physical threats are among 
the greatest dangers to the cloud. Most CSPs are acutely aware of these threats to their 
core IT infrastructure from natural disasters, terrorist threats, fire, sabotage, and other 
phenomenon. 
CSPs, especially IaaS providers, offer their customers the illusion of unlimited 
compute, network, and storage capacity, often coupled with a frictionless registration 
process that allows anyone with a valid credit card to register and begin using cloud 
services immediately [12]. The relative anonymity of these registration and usage models 
encourages spammers, malicious code authors, and other misusers, who have been able to 
conduct their activities with relative impunity. PaaS providers have traditionally suffered 
most from such attacks; however, recent evidence shows that hackers have begun to 
target IaaS vendors as well [12]. 
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Researchers, however, have not generally operated on the notion that security 
should be built around the application, not the virtual machines; therefore, hypervisors 
are not sufficiently robust. Further, since communication with the hypervisor contains 
vital information, including account names and passwords, it must be secure. Like 
physical computers on a physical network, virtual machines have identical IP addresses. 
Nearby addresses, which are visible to users in the cloud, often share the same hardware. 
Thus, a misuser can determine which physical servers a victim is using within the cloud, 
implanting a malicious virtual machine at that location from which to launch an attack 
[5]. 
Finally, in a virtualized environment, it is relatively easy to steal an entire virtual 
server, along with its data, without anyone noticing. Virtual machines are encapsulated in 
virtual disk files that reside on a virtual host server; therefore, anyone with the right 
permissions can copy the disk file and access data on it. 
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4. THE APPROACH 
4.1. FRAMEWORK OF THE STRUCTURED DEVELOPME	T OF CLOUD 
SECURITY POLICIES 
This section describes the approach used here to analyze security requirements 
and develop security policies in a cloud computing environment. It involves two phases: 
First, cloud security requirements are analyzed. Second, cloud security policies are 
developed, and measures are put in place to communicate and enforce them. Figure 4.1 
shows a high-level view of the approach. 
 
 
Figure 4.1.  A High-Level View of the Approach 
 
As noted above, the HOOMT, which is a major aspect of this approach to the 
analysis of cloud security policies, provides a structured object-oriented design 
Cloud Security Requirements 
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methodology based on hierarchical model development (see figure 4.2). HOOMT allows 
every object in the cloud to be modeled comprehensively and verified systematically for 
completeness. The analysis process introduced here integrates use cases, misuse cases, 
and malactivity swimlane diagrams with the HOOM. The malactivity swimlane diagrams 
decompose misuse cases, revealing in detail the activities of misusers. Also, detailed 
investigation of each incidence of malactivity permits development of more ways to 
prevent or mitigate such malactivity. This technique serves as a countermeasure for 
identified threats. Moreover, more threats can be identified this way; making possible the 
development of comprehensive cloud security policies. The result is a more efficient way 
to discover threats posed to cloud computing systems, both internally and externally. The 
structured development of the cloud security policies together with the relationships 
among the various diagrams at each level is shown in figure 4.2. 
 
4.2. CLOUD SECURITY REQUIREME	TS A	ALYSIS 
Figure 4.3 outlines the process of analyzing to cloud security requirements. The 
process begins with the development of a context object diagram (COD) for the cloud 
computing system; this is considered as a high-order object. This COD represents the 
entire cloud computing system and shows its interactions with external objects such as 
users, either internal or external. The COD also serves as the starting point for the 
analysis process. 
The next step is to identify use cases that describe how the cloud computing 
system responds to requests from users. These cases capture the behavioral requirements  
  
 


































































































































































of the cloud computing system with detailed scenarios derived from the cloud’s 
functionalities. Next, each use case is analyzed thoroughly to determine how it could be 
subverted. Based on this analysis, misuse cases and misusers, either internal or external, 
that can harm the cloud computing system are identified. The misuse cases also reveal the 
various threats posed to the cloud at each level of the hierarchical model.  
To identify security requirements that can serve as countermeasures to these 
misuse cases, the actions taken by misusers must be understood in detail. Malactivity 
swimlane diagrams can be used to further decompose misuse cases. Decomposition 
reveals the details of such misuse events and thus permits identification of more threats. 
It also permits the inclusion of both hostile and legitimate activities and determines the 
point at which prevention and mitigation options can be added to these activities to serve 
as countermeasures. Based on the countermeasures, security requirements are specified.  
The COD is further decomposed and the cycle repeated, generating cloud security 
requirements at the end of every cycle. The term decompose refers to a process that 
reveals the subcomponents of the cloud object at a lower level [3]. The decomposition 
and security requirements analysis process continues until a stage is reached at which the 
cloud objects are primitive and corresponding use and misuse cases are fully explored 
[3]. At that point, the cloud security requirements are refined by checking for 
inconsistencies and ambiguities. They serve as a deliverable at the end of the first phase 





Figure 4.3.  Cloud Security Requirements Process 
 
4.3. CLOUD SECURITY POLICY DEVELOPME	T, COMMU	ICATIO	 A	D 
E	FORCEME	T 
In this work, the security policies for cloud computing systems are based on the 
cloud security requirements through the security requirements analysis process. Policies 
and requirements are not necessarily mapped one-to-one. Usually, one requirement can 
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be satisfied by a set of security policies. These requirements are high-level statements of 
countermeasures that will adequately prevent or mitigate identified misuse cases and are 
dependent on rigorous analysis of threats to the cloud at each level [17], as described 
above. Consequently, security policies are developed and integrated into the development 
of the cloud computing system. This approach provides a framework of best practices for 
CSPs and makes security policies tenable. The policies ensure that risk is minimized and 
that any security incidents are met with an effective response [17]. The process of 
developing these policies permits authorized security personnel to monitor and probe 
security breaches and other issues pertaining to cloud security. 
The process begins with a statement articulating the motivation for developing 
such a policy, describing the malactivities to be governed by it, and listing the cloud 
assets to be protected. The problem the policy is designed to resolve is articulated. In 
general, the overall benefit of the policy is described. Next, those individuals or groups 
who must understand and observe this policy in order to perform their job are identified. 
Any exceptions to this policy are also noted. 
At this point, the policy itself is articulated, including a description of what is 
actually covered by the policy, the responsibilities of the various individuals or groups 
involved, and the technical requirements that each individual or device must meet to 
comply with the policy. 
Finally, once cloud security policies have been developed, they must be 
disseminated to users, staff, management, vendors, third party processors, and support 
personnel. The complexity of the cloud environment demands that some, if not all, 
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policies be communicated to consumers. Enforcing these policies is also an essential part 
of the process. This is accomplished by establishing a record that those involved have 
read, understood, and agreed to abide by the policies, and by discussing how violations 
will be handled. Figure 4.4 illustrates the process described above to develop security 
policies for cloud computing systems. 
 
 
Figure 4.4.  Cloud Security Policy Development Process  
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5. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES 
The example described here illustrates how the proposed approach analyzes 
security requirements and develops security policies for cloud computing systems. This 
example involves a company that wants to create a cloud computing system to provide 
data hosting and processing services for the healthcare industry throughout the United 
States. As a CSP, this company understands the importance of secure and timely access 
to data for such an industry. The company also wants to maintain its own secure, state-of-
the-art data center to house the servers, networking equipment, backup power systems, 
and other tools necessary to deliver fast, secure, and effective data services. The approach 
described here was used to develop a security policy document for this potential CSP.  
First, the cloud was considered an object, and a COD was developed for it. The 
COD shows the relationship between the cloud object (i.e., the target system) and 
external objects including the CSP, the contingency, and the cloud end user (CEU). 
Natural contingencies like tornados, floods, and earthquakes can affect the availability of 
the cloud, as can human (intentional) actions like terrorist attacks. At this point, the cloud 
object is considered a high-order object; therefore, it can be decomposed into two or 
more high-order and or primitive objects. Figure 5.1 shows the COD of the cloud. 
Next, the cloud object is decomposed to reveal its constituent objects. This 
represents the first level of the process, the point at which analysis of security 
requirements begins and the associated security policies are developed. The cloud object 
is decomposed into three high-order objects and one primitive object. The high-order 
objects are an application and related services, a hardware system, and virtualization. The 
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only primitive object is the service management. Decomposition of the cloud object 




Figure 5.1.  The COD of the Cloud Object 
 
At this point, both use cases and misuse cases are specified. Figure 5.3 represents 
the use case-misuse case diagram of the cloud object. At this level, the misusers, whether 
contingency or intentional, trigger the following four misuse cases: destroy hardware 
system, change hardware settings, DDoS attack, and unauthorized data access. These 
misuse cases disable or distort the provisioning or consumption of the cloud and involve 



















































































Figure 5.3.  Use-Case/ Misuse Case Diagram at the Cloud Level 
 
 
A malactivity swimlane diagram is developed for each misuse case to further 
decompose them. Sindre [8] offers a detailed description of the malactivity swimlane 
diagram notation. For demonstration purposes, the misuse case of unauthorized data 
access (an internal threat) will be decomposed at this level (see figure 5.4). In this 
scenario, an unauthorized user (e.g., a member of the cleaning staff) who has stolen an 
authorized user’s badge enters the network operations center (NOC). A security staff 
member allows the cleaning staff access to the NOC. This security staff member is also 
considered a misuser because he is assumed to have connived with the cleaning staff 
member in this operation. The cleaning staff member then guesses the login information 


































Figure 5.4.  Malactivity Swimlane Diagram for the Unauthorized Data Access Misuse 
Case together with the Prevention or Mitigation Options 
 
As shown in figure 5.4, decomposing misuse cases with malactivity swimlanes 
reveals the details of activities performed by the misuser. Thus, it is possible to determine 
the point in the process at which mitigation or prevention can be added. For instance, in 
order to prevent guesses of login details, the CSP can implement a strong authentication 
system with one-time password rather than just a username and password authentication. 








































Such an authentication method uses information sent in a short messaging service (SMS) 
to the user as part of the login process. 
Once all misuse cases are decomposed and their respective mitigation and 
prevention options specified, security requirements are also developed. Figure 5.5 shows 
the top-level security requirements for the cloud object. 
 
 
Figure 5.5.  Security Requirements at the Cloud-Object Level 
 
With these security requirements, it should now be possible to determine what 
kind of security policies must be developed. This is done such that for every security 
requirement is met by at least one associated security policy. Figure 5.6 shows an 
example of a security policy that meets CSR 1.5. 
Top-Level Cloud Security Requirements (CSR): 
 
CSR 1.1: The system must provide physical protection to all physical hardware. 
 
CSR 1.2: The system must employ multifactor authentication with a one-time 
password for CEUs to prevent intrusion. 
 
CSR 1.3: The system must monitor network requests so that any kind of distributed 
denial of service (DDoS) attack can be detected. 
 
CSR 1.4: The system must audit and log CEUs, recording who logs in, when, and 
from where in order to recover from a breach. 
 
CSR 1.5: The system must encrypt data in transit in order to prevent vital data from 





Figure 5.6.  Security Policy to Meets CSR 1.5 
 
The cloud security requirement analysis and policy development process then 
continues at the second level. The virtualization object is of particular interest in this 
research since virtualization is the main driver of cloud applications and services. Figure 
5.7 shows the decomposition of this object into four primitive objects, and the 
relationships among them. The objects are the hypervisor, the virtual network system, the 
resource management system, and the virtual machine (VM).  
Data-in-Transit Encryption Policy 
 
1.0 Purpose 
This document describes the encryption of data in transit to ensure the information 




This policy applies to any data in transit. 
 
3.0 Policy 
All data in transit must be encrypted, and such data must be protected to prevent 
their unauthorized disclosure and subsequent fraudulent use. 
 
4.0 Enforcement 
Any employee found to have violated this policy may be subject to disciplinary 
action, up to and including termination of employment. 
 
5.0 Definitions 
Data in transit refers to any data transferred in the cloud. 
 
6.0 Revision History 




Figure 5.7.  Decomposition of the Virtualization Object 
 
Also at this level, use cases and misuse cases are specified. Four use cases were 
identified: create VM, reconfigure, network VMs, and manage VMs. The misusers, either 
contingency or intentional, initiate plant malicious VM, VM escape, and change VM 
settings misuse cases. Figure 5.8 shows the use case-misuse case diagram. At this level, 
the VM escape misuse case is further decomposed with the malactivity swimlane 
diagram. Security prevention and mitigation options are specified in the decomposition as 
shown in figure 5.9. Plant malicious VM, and change VM settings misuse cases are also 
decomposed and their respective security prevention and or mitigation options specified. 





































requirements are obtained, security policies are developed to meet them. For example, 
figure 5.11 shows a cloud security policy developed to meet CSR 2.1. 
 
 
Figure 5.8.  Use-Case/ Misuse-Case for the Virtualization Object 
 
Securing the hardware system is just as important as securing the virtualization 
system. At the third level, the hardware system object is analyzed and further 
decomposed into the following four primitive objects: hardware devices, network 
management system, cooling system, and power system. Figure 5.12 shows the high- 
order object model for the decomposed hardware system object decomposed and the 
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Figure 5.9.  Malactivity Swimlane Diagram for the VM Escape Misuse Case together 
with the Prevention or Mitigation Options 
 
 
Figure 5.10.  Security Requirements at the Virtualization-Object Level 
Second-Level Cloud Security Requirements (CSR): 
 
CSR 2.1: The system must restrict physical and logical access to the hypervisor to 
prevent VM from having direct interaction with hypervisor. 
 
CSR 2.2: The system must employ efficient load balancing techniques to prevent 
VMs from causing denial of service (DoS) attacks.  
 
CSR 2.3: The system must implement authentication of network flow such that a 
guest VM cannot monitor other VMs. 
 
CSR 2.4: The system must monitor guest-host VM interaction for improper 
configuration changes, and in the event of any such incident it should 
report to the network manager. 
































Figure 5.11.  Security Policy to Meet CSR 2.1 
 
 
Hypervisor Access Policy 
 
1.0 Purpose 
This document describes cloud information security’s required encryption of data in 
transit. This is designed to prevent unauthorized disclosure of vital information. 
 
2.0 Scope 
This policy applies to all nonhost virtual machines in the cloud. 
 
3.0 Policy 
All data in transit must be encrypted, and data covered by this policy must be 
protected to prevent their unauthorized disclosure and subsequent fraudulent use. 
 
4.0 Enforcement 
Any employee found to have violated this policy may be subject to disciplinary 
action, up to and including termination of employment. 
 
5.0 Definitions 
Data in transit – Data transferred in the cloud. 
 
6.0 Revision History 




Figure 5.12.  Decomposition of the Hardware System Object 
 
Supply power, network hardware devices, and supply hardware are the three use 
cases specified at Level 3. Threats at this level of the cloud are mostly physical. The 
misusers, either contingency or intentional, initiate five misuse cases, including destroy 
network devices, destroy power devices, change power configuration, destroy cooling 
systems, and change temperature configuration. Figure 5.13 is a use-case/ misuse-case 
diagram for this level. 
Here, the destroy power devices misuse case is decomposed further with a 
malactivity swimlane diagram. Figure 5.14 shows this diagram together with the security 
prevention options that are specified to prevent or mitigate such threats. The security 
requirements that are developed at this level are shown in figure 5.15. Finally, the 



































Figure 5.13.  Use Case-Misuse Case for the Hardware System Object 
 
 
Figure 5.14.  Malactivity Swimlane Diagram for the Destroy-Power-Devices Misuse 
Case together with the Prevention or Mitigation Options 
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Figure 5.15.  Security Requirements at the Hardware System Level 
 
 
Figure 5.16.  Security Policy to Meet CSRs 3.1 
  
Physical Devices Monitoring Policy 
 
1.0 Purpose 
This policy is intended to protect the CSP against loss of service by providing 
constant monitoring of hardware devices.  
 
2.0 Scope 





All hardware devices shall be checked manually on a daily basis and recorded. 
 
4.0 Enforcement 
Any employee found to have violated this policy may be subject to disciplinary 
action, up to and including termination of employment. 
 
5.0 Revision History 
09/24/2010 - 1.0 initial policy version, Kenneth Fletcher 
Third-Level Security Requirements: 
 
CSR 3.1: The system must routinely monitor power quality and load in order to 
detect any change in power configuration. 
 
CSR 3.2: The system must routinely monitor temperature in order to detect any 
change in temperature configuration and maintain constant cooling of 
hardware devices. 
 
CSR 3.3: The system must routinely monitor and detect coolant or water leaks in 
order to prevent destruction of power devices, cooling systems, cables, 
and other hardware. 
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6. CASE STUDY 
Section 5, explained how cloud security requirements can be analyzed and 
security policies developed. Here, the proposed approach is applied to a real case study 
involving a cloud service provider whose name has been omitted due to confidential 
reasons. The objective is to analyze the company’s current security state and provide 
advice on strengthening the security of its cloud. 
The company, headquartered in St. Louis, Missouri, offers highly available 
business solutions, including colocation, cloud computing, managed services, and 
insourcing in a carrier-class data center facility. The private cloud computing 
environment provides access to resources from storage, virtual servers, and desktops to 
email and mobile devices, all on an as-needed basis. These systems are powered from 
their own platform supported by a 30,000-square-foot state-of-the-art data center in St. 
Louis. In order to provide a geographically diverse redundancy system as a backup for 
the primary data center, the service provider operates another data center in Cincinnati, 
Ohio. 
The private cloud offerings of the company fall primarily in the IaaS space, 
although it offers a number of applications that are delivered and consumed by clients on 
a variable per-use basis. 
The security requirements analysis process begins by developing the COD of the 
private cloud. Because St. Louis, Missouri, is an earthquake zone, the cloud is vulnerable 






Figure 6.1.  COD of the Private Cloud Object 
 
The private cloud object is decomposed into four subobjects: three high-order 
objects and a primitive object. The high-order objects are services, hardware resources, 
and the VMware vSphere. The only primitive object is service management. 
Decomposition of the cloud object reveals not only its constituent objects but also the 
relationship among them (see figure 6.2). 
Figure 6.3 represents the use-case/ misuse-case diagram of the private cloud at the 
cloud level. The following three misuse cases were identified: destroy hardware, change 
hardware settings, and unauthorized data access. These misuse cases subvert the supply 







































































































The cloud service provider for this case study understands its datacenter as 
belonging to its clients and therefore permits clients access to it. With this setup, internal 
threats are likely to be the main security issue at this level. Therefore, the unauthorized 
data access misuse case is decomposed here to find determine how such a setup could be 
compromised and develop prevention or mitigation options to serve as countermeasures. 
Figure 6.4 is a malactivity swimlane diagram describing a scenario in which one 
client (client A) goes into the data center to steal another client’s (client B) hard drive and 
access confidential data on it. The decomposition clarifies the activites of client A and 
makes it easier to prevent them. The prevention or mitigation options specified in figure 
6.4 are translated into security requirements, which are shown in figure 6.5. These are the 
security requirements specified at the first level of the private cloud. Figure 6.6 shows a 
security policy to meet CSR 1.2. 
At the second level of the security requirements analysis process, the VMware 
vSphere object (the virtualization layer) is analyzed. Figure 6.7 shows its decomposition 
and the relationship existing among its four constituent primitive objects. The objects are 
VMware ESXi hypervisor, vCenter server, virtual machine, and application services. 
Also at this level, use cases and misuse cases are specified. Three use cases were 
identified: create VM, vstorage, and manage VM host. The intentional misuser, whether a 
cloud user or the CSP itself, initiates DoS attack, VM escape, MITM attack, and redirect 
packets misuse cases. Figure 6.8 shows the use-case/ misuse-case diagram. At this level, 





Figure 6.4.  Malactivity Swimlane Diagram for the Unauthorized Data Access Misuse 
Case together with the Prevention or Mitigation Options 
 
 
Figure 6.5.  Security Requirements at the Private Cloud Level 
Private Cloud Object-Level Cloud Security Requirements (CSR): 
 
CSR 1.1: The system must provide hardware monitoring alarms for all physical 
hardware. 
 
CSR 1.2: The system must audit and log client and visitor access to the data center, 
recording who logs in and when in order to recover from a breach. 
 
CSR 1.3: The system must encrypt data at rest in order to prevent vital data from 
reaching unauthorized users. 
Misuser Activities Prevention/Mitigation Options 






























Figure 6.6.  Security Policy to Meet CSR 1.2. 
Customer and Visitor Data Center Access Policy 
 
1.0 Purpose 
The purpose of this document is to provide guidance for customers and visitors to the data 
center, as well as for employees sponsoring visitors. 
 
2.0 Scope 






All visitors must arrive at a designated check-in entrance (i.e., the main reception desk) and 
present government-issue photo identification at time of check-in. 
All visitors must be met by their employee sponsor at the time of check-in. Visitors must 
sign a “Visitor Agreement.” All visitor electronics will be checked in as well. 
 
3.2 Badges 
Customer and visitor badges must be worn at all times. Employees are instructed to 
immediately report anyone not wearing a customer, visitor, or employee badge. 
Visitors requiring access to areas controlled by swipe card access locks should be assisted by 
their sponsoring employee. 
 
3.3 Photographs and Cameras 
Customers and visitors are not permitted to take photographs inside the data center, without 
specific prior arrangement with sponsoring employees.  
 
3.4 Check-Out 
Visitors will check out at the same station where they arrived. All visitor electronics will be 
checked out. 
 
3.5 Exit Inspection 




Violation of any part of this policy by any employee will result in suitable disciplinary 
action, up to and including prosecution and or termination.  
Violation of any part of this policy by any visitor can result in similar disciplinary action 
against the sponsoring employee, and can also result in termination of services or 
prosecution in the case of criminal activity. 
 
6.0 Revision History 
09/24/2010 - 1.0 initial policy version, Kenneth Fletcher 
36 
 
Figure 6.9 shows this decomposition together with the prevention or mitigation 
options. The standard MITM ARP cache spoofing attack is still an issue with the 
VMware vSpehre object. This attack occurs when a victim thinks the attacker is the 
default gateway and the actual default gateway thinks otherwise. 
 
 
Figure 6.7.  Decomposition of the VMware vSphere Object 
 
During the course of this attack the victim sends packets to the attacker (default 
gateway) who then copies the information, stops it, or at worst changes the contents of 











































(actual) for further processing. When the receiving packet returns, the data can be 
similarly intercepted.  
Other misuse cases identified here were also decomposed and their respective 
security prevention or mitigation options specified. Security requirements for this level 
are shown in Figure 6.10. Finally at this level, security policy to meet CSR 2.1 is 
developed as shown in figure 6.11. 
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Figure 6.9.  Malactivity Swimlane Diagram for the MITM Attack Misuse Case together 
with Prevention or Mitigation Options 
 
 
Figure 6.10.  Cloud Security Requirements at the VMware vSphere Object Level 
 
VMware vSphere Object-Level Cloud Security Requirements (CSR): 
 
CSR 2.1: The system must isolate all traffic to and from storage repositories (data-
in-motion) from other nonstorage traffic. 
 
CSR 2.2: The system must not allow VM repositories or datastores to be accessible 
to other VMs except for the VM host servers.  
 
CSR 2.3: The system must restrict physical and logical access to the hypervisor to 
prevent VM from having direct interaction with hypervisor. 
 
CSR 2.4: The system must employ efficient load balancing techniques to prevent 
VMs from causing denial of service (DoS) attacks. 





























Figure 6.11.  Security Policy to Meet CSR 2.1. 
 
Finally, the hardware resources object was analyzed and further decomposed into 
the following four primitive objects: hardware devices, network management system, 
cooling system, and power system. The high-order object model for the hardware 
resources object and the relationship between its primitive objects are represented in 
figure 6.12. 
 
Data-in-Motion Isolation Policy 
 
1.0 Purpose 
The purpose of this policy is to meet CSR 2.1, which defines the isolation of data in 
motion in order to prevent MITM attacks when using and managing virtualization 
with VMware vSphere technologies.  
 
2.0 Scope 
This policy applies to any data-in-motion 
 
3.0 Policy 
All data in transit must be isolated by employing storage area network (SAN)




Any employee found to have violated this policy may be subject to disciplinary 
action, up to and including termination of employment. 
 
5.0 Definitions 
Data in transit refers to data transferred in the VMware vSphere vStorage medium. 
 
6.0 Revision History 




Figure 6.12.  Decomposition of the Hardware Resources Object 
 
Supply power, network hardware devices, and supply hardware are three use 
cases specified at the hardware resources level. Threats at this level of the private cloud 
are mostly physical. The misusers, contingency and intentional, initiate five misuse cases, 
including destroy network devices, destroy power devices, change power configuration, 
destroy cooling systems, and change temperature configuration. Figure 6.13 shows the 
use-case/ misuse-case diagram for this level. 
Here, the destroy power devices misuse case was decomposed further with a 
malactivity swimlane diagram. Figure 6.14 shows this decomposition together with the 










































requirements that were developed at level 3. Also, figure 6.16 shows the security policy 
developed to meet CSR 3.1. 
 
 







































Figure 6.14.  Malactivity Swimlane Diagram for the Destroy Power Devices Misuse Case 




Figure 6.15.  Security Requirements at the Hardware Resources Object Level 
 
Hardware Resources Object-Level Cloud Security Requirements (CSR): 
 
CSR 3.1: The system must routinely monitor power quality and load in order to 
detect any change in power configuration. 
 
CSR 3.2: The system must routinely monitor temperature in order to detect any 
change in temperature configuration and maintain constant cooling of 
hardware devices. 
 
CSR 3.3: The system must routinely monitor and detect coolant or water leaks in 
order to prevent destruction of power devices, cooling systems, cables, 
and other hardware. 
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Figure 6.16.  Security Policy to Meet CSR 3.2. 
  
Periodic Maintenance Policy 
 
1.0 Purpose 
The purpose of this document is to define the standards for effective maintenance of 
the private cloud’s assets so that equipment remains safe at all times. 
 
2.0 Scope 




3.1 Maintenance Standards 
Each piece of equipment will be allocated an importance rating of 1 - 5. Maintenance 
standards will vary depending on the importance of the facility, per the guide below: 
1. Not important: Carry out only essential maintenance. 
2. Low importance: Defer non-essential maintenance where possible. 
3. Fair importance: Carry out maintenance based on risk assessment. 
4. Important: Maintain to the best standard that resources allow. 
5. Very important: Maintain to a very high standard. 
 
3.2 Maintenance Categories 
Each equipment must be categorized as one of the following: preventive maintenance, 
statutory maintenance, corrective maintenance, or backlog maintenance. 
 
4.0 Enforcement 
Violation of any part of this policy by any employee will result in suitable disciplinary 
action, up to and including prosecution and or termination. 
 
5.0 Revision History 
09/24/2010 - 1.0 initial policy version, Kenneth Fletcher 
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7. CO	CLUSIO	S A	D FUTURE WORK 
Cloud computing is becoming popular and represents the future of computing. 
Before it can be embraced by individuals and enterprises, however, the issue of security 
must be addressed. Early consideration of security in cloud computing systems places it 
on a par with other functional requirements of the system and significantly improves the 
security of the system. This work has successfully addressed these security issues, by 
developing a process to determine security requirements and develop policies for a cloud 
computing system level-by-level in a structured manner. This methodology analyzes 
security requirements by identifying threats posed by misusers both external and internal 
to a system. The process was applied here to typical cloud architecture to demonstrate its 
function and it was further applied to an actual case study of a cloud service provider in 
St. Louis, Missouri. In each case, misuse cases at three different were identified. 
Malactivity swimlane diagrams for these misuse cases were generated, permitting 
development of countermeasures for prevention or mitigation. Security requirements 
were then derived based on the prevention or mitigation options. Finally, security policies 
were developed to meet at least each requirement. 
Developing comprehensive cloud-specific security policies is a very difficult task 
that requires collaboration and insight from many individuals in various areas of 
expertise. This is very important because the cloud architecture is very broad. If not 
written clearly and consistenly observed, cloud security policies can actually complicate 
things rather than helping to prevent or mitigate security issues in cloud computing. 
Enforcing cloud security policies are difficult and require management, employee, and 
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user support. Also, due to the difficulty that enforcing secuirty policies bring, it is harder 
to evaluate security compliance in cloud computing. For future work, I will research into 
and develop cloud-specific security metrics in order to quantify security in cloud 
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